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Abstract:  This paper examines the role of U.S. domestic politics in the allocation of foreign aid
using panel data on aid to 119 countries from 1960 to 1997.  Employing proxies for four aid
allocation criteria (development concerns, strategic importance, commercial importance, and the
degree of democratization), we find evidence that each influences aid allocation, although the
evidence is stronger for some criteria (development concerns, commercial importance) than for
others (strategic importance, degree of democratization).  Furthermore, the allocation pattern
depends on the composition of the U.S. government.  When the president and Congress are liberal,
development concerns receive more weight in the allocation process than when the president and/or
Congress are more conservative.  When the Congress is more conservative, commercial concerns
have more weight than when the Congress is liberal.  These findings have practical importance in
light of current attempts to overhaul the allocation of both bilateral and multilateral aid.
JEL codes:  D78, F35, O19, P45
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1.  Introduction
Several factors make it important for economists to understand the politics of foreign aid.  First,
insight into the process through which aid is distributed contributes in a very general way to the
economics literature for the simple reason that foreign aid involves a substantial quantity of scarce
resources.  Second, there is a rapidly growing empirical literature that seeks to identify the
effectiveness of aid in meeting development objectives, and much of that literature relies on the
power of political variables to predict aid allocations (Boone 1996, Burnside and Dollar 2000).
Third, the success or failure of attempts to reform the foreign aid process depend directly on the
politics of donor countries as well as on the politics of aid-receiving countries.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the aid allocation process by analyzing the
distribution of U.S. bilateral aid.  Our analysis starts from the observation that aid-receiving
countries differ in terms of their potential for development, commercial importance, geopolitical
role, and form of government.  Each year, a recipient country’s share of U.S. aid may reflect these
factors.  The relative influence of each of these factors may change over time, however, in part
because elections in the U.S. alter the composition of the U.S. government.  For example, a shift
from a liberal to a conservative president or Congress is likely mirrored by a shift in the objectives
of foreign aid and, consequently, a shift in the emphasis given to each of the underlying criteria for
aid allocation.  If the objectives of these political actors have a systematic influence on the
distribution of aid across recipient countries, political shifts will cause observable changes in aid
allocations.  Examining the effects of these political shifts illuminates the political economy of aid
1For an early paper that models the allocation of aid in a public choice context, see Dudley and
Montmarquette (1976), who start with the demand for aid among donor country voters.  Also see Lagae
(1990), Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2000), Lundborg (1998), and Mosley (1985).
2All 119 countries in our data set are included in the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s
(2004) database on aid flows.  Thus, all received bilateral or multilateral aid during at least some of the years
covered in our data set.  A key factor in our analysis, however, is that in any given year, only a subset
received aid from the U.S.  In this paper, we will use the phrase “aid-receiving countries” to refer to the
countries in our data set.
3The common space data are similar to the widely used congressional data generated by Poole and
Rosenthal’s NOMINATE algorithm (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
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allocation.1
To provide new insight into the role that these factors play in aid allocation, we analyze panel
data on U.S. bilateral aid flows to 119 countries from 1960 to 1997.2  We consider both the decision
of whether to provide aid to a country and, conditional on the decision to provide aid, the decision
of what level of aid to provide.  We identify proxy variables to reflect each recipient country’s
importance with respect to four aid allocation criteria:  development concerns, commercial
importance to the U.S., strategic importance to the U.S., and the degree of democratization.  To
measure political shifts in the U.S., we place the president and Congress along a liberal-conservative
dimension using Poole’s (1998) common space data, then examine whether the estimated effects of
the key proxies (development, strategic, commercial, and government type) vary systematically with
the liberal-conservative locations of the president and Congress.3
The econometric results provide evidence that each of our proxies for aid allocation criteria is
systematically related to the actual allocation of aid.  The evidence is more conclusive for some
criteria (development, commercial) than for others (strategic, democratization).  Perhaps the most
important finding is that the pattern of aid allocation depends on the composition of the U.S.
government.  Development concerns appear to have greater weight under liberal Congresses than
4All these papers examine the influence of recipient country characteristics on the allocation of aid
between recipients.  Alesina and Dollar (2000) update the previous aid allocation literature and investigate
the role of recipient country policies and political structure.  Alesina and Weder (2002) examine links
between recipient country corruption and aid flows.  Dreher and Jensen (2003) analyze the influence of the
U.S. in IMF lending, finding that countries voting with the U.S. in the UN faced fewer conditions on IMF
loans.  Fleck and Kilby (2005) test for the influence of U.S. interests on World Bank lending and use the
same measure of need as in this paper.  Boschini and Olofsgård (2001) assess the importance of the Cold War
motive for providing aid, including a variable to measure political orientation of the donor government.
Goldstein and Moss (2003) examine the level and share of U.S. bilateral aid to Africa under Republicans and
Democrats and find that one must look jointly at the parties controlling the Administration, the House, and
the Senate.  Neumayer (2003) estimates the extent to which governance enters aid allocation, in aggregate
and for many individual bilateral donors and multilateral agencies.
5See, e.g., Alesina and Dollar (2000), Arvin et al. (2002), Blanton (1994), Carleton and Stohl (1987),
Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), Hofrenning (1990), Hook (1998), McCormick and Mitchell (1988),
Neumayer (2003), Pasquarello (1988), Poe (1990, 1991, 1992), Poe and Sirirangsi (1993), Svensson (1999),
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under conservative Congresses, and, similarly, greater weight under liberal presidents than under
conservative presidents, ceteris paribus.  Furthermore, commercial interests appear to have greater
weight under conservative Congresses than under liberal Congresses.  We find no conclusive
evidence of a systematic link between liberal-conservative shifts and the responsiveness of aid to the
aid-receiving country’s strategic importance or degree of democracy.  Our results hold when the
sample is restricted to Cold War years; thus, the results are not an artifact of the transition that
occurred at the end of the Cold War.  Overall, the results suggest that the importance of allocation
criteria depends substantially, and in a complex manner, on domestic politics.
These findings contribute new insight into the allocation of aid.  Our paper builds on recent
empirical work on the political and economic determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid
allocations; see, for example, Alesina and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002), Boschini and
Olofsgård (2001), Dreher and Jensen (2003), Fleck and Kilby (2005), Goldstein and Moss (2003),
and Neumayer (2003).4  Our paper also adds to a substantial literature debating the role of human
rights and democracy in U.S. aid allocations.5  While it is widely known that aid has more support
and Valverde (1999).
6A large literature has focused on the aid policies of the U.S., which has long had both a sizable
bilateral program and substantial influence over multilateral aid agencies (Fleck and Kilby 2005, Gwin 1997,
Kilby 2005).  The influence of multiple interests (development, strategic, and commercial) in U.S. aid
allocation is well documented (Alesina and Dollar 2000,  Ball and Johnson 1996, Maizels and Nissanke
1984, McKinlay and Little 1979, Neumayer 2003).  On Democratic administrations providing more aid, see
Eggleston (1987), though more recent work by Goldstein and Moss (2003) finds different results for aid to
Africa.
7We have excluded observations from our data set if they have a missing variable.  In addition, we
have excluded three pairs of countries entirely:  China and Taiwan because they lack complete UN voting
(and other) data, North Korea and South Korea because they also lack complete UN voting (and other) data,
and Israel and Egypt because they receive such large shares of U.S. aid for reasons that differ from the focus
of this paper.  The panel is unbalanced, most notably because some countries came into existence, while
others disappeared, during the time period covered by our data set.
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from liberals than from conservatives, we show in this paper that liberal-regime aid differs
systematically from conservative-regime aid with respect to allocation criteria as well.6  As we
discuss in the conclusion, this finding is particularly important in light of current attempts to
overhaul the allocation of both bilateral and multilateral aid.
2.  Methods and Data
This section describes the data we use to measure aid allocations, recipient country
characteristics, and politicians’ locations on the liberal-conservative dimension.  For a listing of
variable definitions and data sources, see Appendix A.  For descriptive statistics, see Appendices B
and C.
The empirical analysis is based on an annual, country-level panel covering 1960-1997.7  We
analyze both the decision of whether to provide aid to a country and, conditional on the decision to
provide aid, the decision of what level of aid to provide.  Thus, we consider two dependent variables.
The first is a binary variable equal to one for country i in year t if that country received a positive
8Defining the dependent variable and, where appropriate, the country characteristics in terms of
shares provides a natural way to match units and remove the effects of trends and fluctuations in the total
aid budget.  Eggleston (1987), Fleck and Kilby (2005), Gang and Lehman (1990), Goldstein and Moss
(2003), Kilby (2005), Neumayer (2003) and Trumbull and Wall (1994) also use aid shares.  As discussed
later in this section, we employ share variables not just for U.S. aid, but for aid from several other donors,
imports, exports, and population.  When calculating share variables, it is important to consider that some
countries have missing data for some years but not other years, and that a country may have different
variables missing for different years.  To ensure that each share variable can be compared meaningfully to
the other share variables in any given year, we calculate shares as the fraction of totals over the group of
countries in our data set that have aid, import, export, and population data for that given year.
9This group is sometimes termed “liked-minded countries” (e.g., Neumayer, 2003).  Similar variables
have also been used by Fleck and Kilby (2005) and Kilby (2005).
10Using an aggregate measure of aid for these small donors reduces the empirical limitations that
might arise from the limited geographic spread of an individual small donor’s aid program (see Hoadley
1980).  As discussed later, we include regional dummies in some of our econometric specifications and
country fixed effects in others; this controls for the potential effects of colonial ties between the aid-receiving
countries and the small donors, and it should make the small donor aid variable useful for indicating changes
in aid allocation patterns resulting from liberal-conservative shifts even if the small donor aid variable is not
purely a proxy for developmental and humanitarian concerns.  When interpreting the empirical results, it is
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amount of development aid from the U.S. in year t (and equal to zero otherwise).  The second
dependent variable is recipient country i’s share of total U.S. bilateral aid disbursements in year t.8
The analysis focuses on proxies for four country characteristics:  the development effectiveness of
aid and/or the level of need; the strategic importance to the U.S.; the commercial importance to the
U.S.; the type of government on an autocracy-democracy scale.
The proxy for development effectiveness and need is bilateral aid allocations by a group of small
donors:  Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.9  The variable (Small Donor Aid)
is measured as country i’s share of small donor bilateral aid in year t.  Numerous studies have found
that these donors allocate their aid in a more development-oriented and humanitarian manner than
do large donors such as the U.S., Japan, France, and the U.K. (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Hoadley,
1980; McGillivray, 1989; Rao, 1997; Rodrik, 1995; Stokke, 1989).  Thus, the share of small donor
aid summarizes need and the perceived effectiveness of aid in the recipient country.10  This variable
also important to remember that the estimated coefficients on small donor aid are conditional on the other
explanatory variables, and vice versa; we consider this again in Section 3.
11See, for example, Isham and Kaufman (1999) and World Bank (1998).  An additional advantage
of using Small Donor Aid is its accuracy and availability, in contrast to data on income and poverty in
developing countries.  Without question, Small Donor Aid is not a perfect proxy (Macdonald and Hoddinott
2004), but it is not obvious that a better proxy exists.
12Trade is widely used as a proxy for donor commercial interests (Andersen et al., 2005; Fleck and
Kilby, 2005; Frey and Schneider, 1986; Kilby, 2005; Maizels and Nissanke, 1986; McKinlay and Little,
1979; Meernik et al., 1998; Neumayer, 2003; Weck-Hannemann and Schneider, 1991; Wittkopf, 1972).
13For a more detailed discussion of this variable, see Gartzke, Jo, and Tucker’s (1999)
documentation.  Signorino and Ritter (1999) discuss the advantages of S scores over alternative measures
of similarity.  Lancaster (2000) examines the role of strategic interests in U.S. aid allocations.  Other work
examining both UN voting and U.S. aid allocation includes Alesina and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder
(2002), Ball and Johnson (1996), Boschini and Olofsgård (2001), Lundborg (1998), Neumayer (2003), Wang
(1999), and Wittkopf (1973).
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offers an important advantage over direct measures of poverty and income; although variables
measuring GDP and poverty may indicate the need for aid, they have no clear relationship to the
effectiveness of aid since developing country government policies that cause widespread poverty can
also undermine the effectiveness of aid.11
The other key country characteristics are similar to those used in previous studies.  To proxy for
U.S. commercial interests, we use U.S. exports to country i and U.S. imports from country i.12  We
measure the trade variables (U.S. Exports, U.S. Imports) as shares of total U.S. exports to and total
U.S. imports from aid-receiving countries.  To proxy for U.S. strategic interests, we use Gartzke, Jo,
and Tucker’s (1999) S measure of affinity in UN voting.  This should reflect similarity between the
policy positions of the U.S. and country i.13  To measure the aid-receiving country’s type of
government, we use a variable (Democracy) based on the annual democracy-autocracy rating from
the Polity IV Project (2000).  The Polity rating ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most
democratic).
14We define our regional dummies using the World Bank’s categorization of countries into six
regions:  East Asia and Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North Africa; Latin America and
Carribean; South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa.  The East Asia and Pacific region is omitted from our estimated
equations in order to allow the estimation of a constant term.  Note that we cannot include a South Asia
dummy because the estimated probits would predict perfectly for that region.  Because we cannot include
a South Asia dummy, we conducted a robustness test by excluding all South Asian countries (and including
the other regional dummies) from our probits; this produced results very similar to those reported in this
paper.
15As discussed earlier, although lower GDP in a country may indeed reflect greater need for aid, it
is also likely to reflect the results of poor policy in that country and, hence, a government that will use aid
dollars in a manner that results in little help for the poor.  Higher GDP may also indicate greater potential
7
Controlling for Other Country Characteristics
There are other country characteristics whose omission could produce spurious coefficients on
the variables of interest.  One key concern is that many factors that influence aid are difficult, if not
impossible, to measure empirically.  For this reason, when addressing the U.S.’s decision of whether
to provide aid to a country, we consider specifications with and without regional dummies.14  By
comparing these specifications, we can gain insight into whether our results might be driven by
omitted variables common to regions.  When addressing the question of how much aid to allocate
to countries receiving aid, we include a complete set of country dummies to account for fixed effects
of geographical proximity to the U.S. and other donors, geological features, colonial and historical
relationships prior to 1960, and all other country-specific factors that remain fixed over time.  We
include a complete set of year dummies in all of our specifications.
Another key concern is to control for inter-temporal, within-country changes whose omission
could cause spurious changes over time in the coefficients on the country characteristics of interest.
For this reason, we include controls for population and GDP.  The population variable for country
i is defined as country i’s share of the population of the set of countries in our data set.  The GDP
variable is real per capita GDP for country i.15  Each of these variables influences aid allocations and,
as a market (commercial motive) or importance in world politics (political motive) (Gang and Lehman, 1990;
Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; McKinlay and Little, 1977).
16To test the robustness of our specifications, we controlled for nonlinear effects of population and
GDP by adding the squares of the population and GDP variables to the specifications reported in this paper.
This had very little effect on the results for any of our other variables.
17We obtained these three variables directly from Keith Poole.  Poole generated the data using Poole
and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE algorithm (a technique similar to factor analysis).  Poole’s (1998) work
complements Poole and Rosenthal’s highly influential work on congressional voting (e.g., Poole and
Rosenthal 1985, 1991, 1997).  See Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for an excellent introduction to their methods
and their widely used NOMINATE data.  In general, the way members of Congress vote on major policy
issues tends to fit a single dimension in NOMINATE space; that is, members with NOMINATE scores on
the liberal side of some dividing point tend to vote one way, members on the conservative side of the dividing
point tend to vote the other way, and most errors in prediction tend to occur among members near the
dividing point.  Poole and Rosenthal attribute this phenomenon to the process of logrolling over myriad
dimensions of policy.  Note that Poole’s data for the House and Senate are averages over members in each
chamber; given that NOMINATE locations reflect logrolling over many dimensions of policy (conditions
under which the median voter theorem does not apply and all members can influence policy), using averages
rather than median scores for each chamber is appropriate.  Fleck and Kilby (2001) show that divisions in
congressional voting on foreign aid issues can be described in NOMINATE space, with liberal positions
predicting support for foreign aid.
18Note that liberal-conservative shifts in the House often occur simultaneously with those in the
Senate.  Consequently, the data do not have enough variation to allow us to estimate separate House and
Senate effects.
19The NOMINATE scores are clearly functions of voter preferences and politicians’ own preferences.
Given the purpose of this paper, we need not sort out the determinants of NOMINATE scores.  All we need
is a method of placing the president, the House, and the Senate on the same liberal-conservative dimension.
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because of cross-country differences in trends, may not be sufficiently accounted for with regional
dummies, country dummies, or year fixed effects.16
Politicians’ Locations on the Liberal-Conservative Dimension
To measure politicians’ locations along a liberal-conservative dimension, we use Poole’s (1998)
common space data, which place the president, the House, and the Senate on the same dimension.17
To measure the position of Congress as a whole, we simply average the House and Senate
positions.18  Higher scores on the dimension reflect more conservative positions.19  Appendix C
presents these data.  Because government spending policies in any given year are influenced largely
20To test whether our conclusions are sensitive to the econometric assumptions we make regarding
the speed at which aid policy adjusts, we estimated AR1 and dynamic panel specifications.  As noted in
Section 3, these robustness tests support the paper’s conclusions.
21Aid is unlikely to influence substantially the other variables of interest (imports and liberal-
conservative shifts).
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by budget decisions in the previous year, we lag the common space scores by one year relative to the
aid variables.  For the same reason, we lag our measures of each aid-receiving country’s trade
variables, UN voting, and type of government; this way, these variables reflect information generally
observable in the same year that we measure the liberal-conservative positions of the U.S.
government.
This assumed rapid response (i.e., a one year lag) of U.S. aid disbursements to political changes
fits well with the institutional literature on both the Congress and the president.  The best known case
of a political shift in Congress changing aid policy occurred following the November 1994 elections.
By the spring of 1995, Congress was voting on issues that were of great consequence for the 1996
fiscal year aid budget (Fleck and Kilby, 2001; Lippman 1996).  The tight link between aid and
political change can also be seen with the current U.S. president.  During his first day in office,
President George W. Bush re-instated the Reagan-era “Mexico City restrictions” which cut off U.S.
aid disbursements to any organization providing abortion counseling (Economist, 2001).20
Causation
In view of the previous literature on aid, we consider the potential endogeneity of U.S. Exports,
UN Voting, Democracy, and Small Donor Aid.21  The endogeneity of U.S. Exports is perhaps most
obvious because aid is often tied to purchases of donor goods and services.  However, the magnitude
of the influence of aid on trade is theoretically ambiguous.  Some aid-driven trade may simply
22The figures using the sample mean are $590 million for exports and $11 million for aid.
23Alesina and Dollar (2000) use religion variables as instruments.  These instruments are not suitable
for our purposes because they vary little over time.
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displace exports which would have happened without aid (fungibility); alternatively, there might be
a multiplier effect.  Empirically, we can get some insight by comparing the magnitudes of U.S.
exports to aid-receiving countries and U.S. aid.  For example, in the last year of our data set (1997),
U.S. exports summed over aid-receiving countries are $184 billion, while U.S. aid summed over
these countries is $4.7 billion.  As explained in the next section (Table 1, Equation 3), a 1 percentage
point increase in export share is associated with a 0.256 percentage point increase in aid share.
Using the 1997 numbers, a $1.84 billion increase in exports is associated with $12 million increase
in aid.22  Thus although the issue of reverse causation is theoretically sound, it is unlikely to be of
practical importance to our estimates given the relative magnitudes of trade and aid.
We follow much of the previous literature in treating UN Voting and Democracy as exogenous.
In Alesina and Dollar (2000), the estimated effect of UN voting on U.S. aid are virtually the same
with or without instrumenting for UN voting.23  In a review of the broader literature, Palmer et al.
(2002) examine conflicting results in previous studies and conclude that there is no clear evidence
that aid influences UN voting. Turning to democracy, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find a pattern of
democratization influencing the level of aid from some donors but no systematic tendency for aid
to influence democratization.  Knack (2004) examines the same measure of democracy we do and
finds no evidence that aid promotes democracy.
Perhaps the most important concern with endogeneity arises from the possibility of aid
coordination.  In principle, Small Donors might coordinate with the U.S. (and other donors), say all
24Rowlands and Ketcheson (2002) examine net ODA disbursement shares to countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Up through 1990 Dutch aid is positively related to other bilateral aid (including U.S.
aid) and negatively related to IMF programs while after 1990 Dutch aid is less closely linked to other
bilateral aid and positively linked to presence of World Bank lending.  Swedish aid is positively linked to
other bilateral aid but negatively related to U.S. bilateral aid and the presence of World Bank lending in the
earlier period but reverses in the later period so that the link with other bilateral aid is negative and with U.S.
bilateral aid positive.  Canadian aid through 1990 is positively related to other bilateral aid but negatively
related to U.S. aid and unrelated to World Bank or IMF activity but also reverses after 1990 so that the link
with other bilateral aid programs is negative and with U.S. bilateral aid and World Bank lending is positive.
Also see Arvin et al. (1998).
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agreeing to cut aid to Kenya after evidence of widespread corruption.  Such positive coordination
fits with the developmental explanation for correlation between Small Donor Aid and U.S. Aid.  But
negative coordination is also possible with donors specializing in different recipients.  In the
academic work on the topic, however, there is no clear evidence of any systematic form of aid
coordination.24
Finally, note that these issues of endogeneity raise little concern for our efforts to test for
systematic changes in aid policy arising from liberal-conservative shifts in the U.S. government:  it
is difficult to imagine how aid policy would cause (or proxy for factors that cause) changes in
Poole’s measures of the liberal-conservative positions of the U.S. president and Congress.
  3.  Empirical Results
We begin with a set of benchmark specifications that exclude the effects of liberal-conservative
shifts.  Then we consider a set of specifications to investigate how those shifts influence aid
allocations.  Finally, we examine whether our findings are driven by the end of the Cold War.
Benchmark Equations
Table 1 presents the benchmark equations.  Equations 1 and 2 present the results of probits used
25We estimated standard probits, but in view of the panel nature of the data set, we report t-statistics
based on standard errors adjusted for clustering with respect to countries.  Without this correction, the
standard errors would generally be smaller and the t-statistics correspondingly larger than those we report.
26Data on individual UN votes from Voeten (2004, 2005).  In a very rough sense (because it is based
on particular countries in a particular year and a varying total number of votes), this suggests that switching
23 votes to the pro-U.S. position increases the probability of getting U.S. aid by 10.1%.  In an even rougher
sense (because the probit function is non-linear and the mapping between votes and affinity scores is non-
linear), this implies that switching one vote from anti-U.S. to pro-U.S. increases the probability of getting
U.S. aid by about 0.5%.
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to estimate the likelihood that a country would receive aid from the U.S. in year t.25  The difference
between the equations is that Equation 2 includes regional dummies.  In both equations, the
estimated coefficients on the development proxy (Small Donor Aid) and the strategic proxy (UN
Voting) are positive, substantial, and statistically significant.
To illustrate the magnitudes of the estimated effects, consider how the estimated probability of
receiving aid changes as a result of changes in the explanatory variables for a hypothetical country
in 1997.  With the values of the explanatory variables (other than the year dummies) equal to their
sample means, Equation 1 predicts a .941 probability that a country would receive aid from the U.S.
If that country had Small Donor Aid of zero, the predicted probability would be .750, while if it had
Small Donor Aid of .0458 (the sample mean plus one standard deviation of the variable), the
probability would be .99997.  For UN Voting, consider a similar comparison.  With the S measure
of UN voting affinity at -.403 (the sample mean minus one standard deviation of the variable), the
probability would be .871, while with S at .230 (one standard deviation above the mean), the
probability would be .977.  We can illustrate what this means in actual votes with the examples of
India (S=-.395) and Poland (S=.250).  Of the 54 votes cast by India, 11 were with the U.S.  Of the
51 votes cast by Poland, 34 were with the U.S.26
Several other results are worth mentioning.  Among the other three variables of interest (U.S.
27This appears to contrast with Klitgaard et al. (2005) where governance is statistically significant
in a selection equation for U.S. bilateral aid.  Estimating a similar equation for the 1990s, Neumayer (2003)
finds democracy measures statistically significant and log of exports statistically insignificant.  However,
it is difficult to determine the reason for the difference as variable definitions, data sources, model
specifications, and time periods all differ.
28To illustrate the magnitude of the estimated effects, again consider a hypothetical country in 1997
with the values of the explanatory variables (other than the year dummies) equal to their sample means.  If
the export share were zero, Equation 1 would predict a .929 probability that the country would receive aid,
while if the export share were .0401 (the sample mean plus one standard deviation of the variable), the
probability would increase to .963.  If the import share were zero, Equation 1 would predict a .942
probability that the country would receive aid, while if the import share were .0447 (the sample mean plus
one standard deviation of the variable), the probability would decrease to .936.  A change from extreme
autocracy to extreme democracy (i.e., a change from -10 to 10 in the variable Democracy) would increase
the probability from .917 to .964.
29Recall that the sample here includes countries in year t only if they receive a positive amount of
U.S. aid in year t.  This component of the variation in aid allocations differs from the component that
Equations 1 and 2 analyze.  Thus, Equation 3 provides a different test and new information about aid
patterns.  As a robustness test, we re-estimated the share equations reported in this paper allowing the
residuals to follow an AR1 process.  This had little effect on our results, with the only notable change from
the results reported in this paper being that U.S. Imports would not have a statistically significant effect in
the share equations that exclude the effects of liberal-conservative shifts (i.e., Equation 3 in Tables 1 and 3).
In another robustness test, we estimated the share equations using the full set of observations included in
Equations 1 and 2; that is, we included observations with zero shares.  The results are very similar to the
13
Exports, U.S. Imports, Democracy), none is statistically significant in either equation.27  One should
keep in mind, however, that the estimated coefficients on U.S. Exports, U.S. Imports, and
Democracy do have signs consistent with what we find in our analysis of the share of U.S. bilateral
aid.28  The first control variable, GDP, has a negative and statistically significant coefficient,
indicating that higher income reduces the likelihood of receiving aid.  The coefficients on the second
control, Population, are negative, but statistically insignificant.  The regional dummies are
statistically insignificant (jointly as well as individually), and comparing Equations 1 and 2 shows
that adding them to the specification has relatively little effect on the results of interest.
Equation 3 (in Table 1) examines the determinants of shares of U.S. aid for countries receiving
U.S. aid (the allocation equation), controlling for country fixed effects.29  The results are consistent
share equations presented in this paper (i.e., Equation 3 in Tables 1-4).  One notable difference is that, when
zero shares are included in the sample, UN Voting and Democracy have positive coefficients that approach
statistical significance in the share equation that includes all years and excludes the effects of liberal-
conservative shifts (i.e., in the re-estimation of Equation 3 in Table 1); this is consistent with the overall
conclusions of Equations 1-3 in Table 1.
30Because the Small Donor Aid variable is measured in shares, the .23 estimated coefficient on Small
Donor Aid indicates that an increase in a country’s Small Donor Aid by some given percentage of total small
donor aid would increase the predicted value of the dependent variable (share of U.S. bilateral aid) by .23
times that given percentage.  Similarly, the .26 coefficient on U.S. Exports indicates that an increase in a
country’s purchases of U.S. exports by some given percentage of total U.S. exports would increase the
predicted value of the dependent variable by .26 times that given percentage.  The interpretation of the -.07
coefficient on U.S. Imports indicates that an increase in imports from that country by some given percentage
of total U.S. imports would decrease the predicted value of the dependent variable by .07 times that given
percentage.
31With respect to the control variables, the estimated effect of GDP is negative, as in Equations 1 and
2, while the coefficient on Population is now positive and large.
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with those in Equations 1 and 2 in that the coefficients of interest have the same signs.  There are,
however, two important differences:  (i) the coefficients on the commercial proxies–U.S. Exports
and U.S. Imports–are now substantial and statistically significant and (ii) the coefficient on the
strategic proxy–UN Voting–is now small and far from statistically significant.30  Thus, where
commercial interests appear clearly to matter substantially is in the decision of how much aid to give,
rather than whether or not to give any aid.  And, more specifically, countries to whom the U.S.
exports much receive more aid, while countries from whom the U.S. imports much receive less aid,
ceteris paribus.  This practice of rewarding countries that buy much from (and sell little to) the U.S.
is consistent with a common theme of political debates over imports and exports–the notion that
countries buying U.S. exports are valuable commercial allies to be supported, while countries that
sell goods to the U.S. (“stealing” U.S. jobs) are not.31
Liberal-Conservative Shifts in the U.S. Government
Table 2 is similar to Table 1, but adds ten variables to estimate the effects of liberal-conservative
32As before, regional dummies are insignificant in Equation 2 of Table 2.
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shifts in the U.S. government.  The ten variables are interaction terms to allow the effects of each
of our five main proxies for donor interest to vary with liberal-conservative shifts in the presidency
and in Congress.  For three of the five main proxies (Small Donor Aid, U.S. Exports, and U.S.
Imports), the evidence shows that liberal-conservative shifts have substantial effects.
Examining first the decision of whether to provide any aid to a country, Equations 1 and 2 show
a large estimated effect of liberal-conservative shifts on the econometric role of Small Donor Aid.32
More specifically, for the decision of whether to provide aid, liberal regimes in the U.S. act more like
the small donors than do conservative regimes, and the estimated effects are substantial in
magnitude.  As an illustration, consider the changes in the presidential and congressional common
space locations that resulted from the conservative shift brought about by the 1980 election:  the
common space data indicate a shift in the presidential location from -.470 for Carter to .479 for
Reagan and simultaneous shifts in the House location from -.044 to -.009 and the Senate location
from -.071 to .010.  For a hypothetical aid-receiving country in 1997 with explanatory variables
(other than Small Donor Aid and the year dummies) equal to the sample means, how much would
a conservative shift of this magnitude decrease the marginal effects of Small Donor Aid?  With the
liberal regime’s marginal effects of Small Donor Aid, changing Small Donor Aid from zero to .0458
(the sample mean plus one standard deviation of the variable) would increase the probability of
receiving U.S. aid from .772 to over .99999.  With the conservative regime’s marginal effects of
Small Donor Aid, the same increase in Small Donor Aid would increase the probability of receiving
U.S. aid from .772 to .789.  Thus, a conservative shift of the magnitude brought about by the 1980
election would cause a large expected reduction in the degree of similarity between U.S. and small
33To illustrate the magnitude, consider the same between-regime comparison we performed for a
hypothetical country’s change in Small Donor Aid.  Under a liberal U.S. regime (i.e., Carter-era common
space locations), Equation 1 predicts that changing Democracy from -10 to 10 (i.e., a switch from extreme
autocracy to extreme democracy) would increase the probability of receiving U.S. aid from .969 to .986.
Under a conservative U.S. regime (i.e., Reagan-era common space locations), the same change in Democracy
would increase the probability of receiving aid from .945 to .993.
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donor decisions with respect to which countries receive aid.
The results for the Democracy variable also merit some discussion.  Although the coefficients
on the interaction terms for Democracy are not statistically significant, the results in Table 2 raise
an interesting point regarding the econometric value of incorporating measures of donor politics.
Comparing the first two equations in Table 2 to the first two equations in Table 1 shows that
controlling for liberal-conservative shifts increases the coefficients and t-statistics on Democracy.
Thus, to some extent, the effects of the Democracy variable may be masked when U.S. liberal-
conservative shifts are omitted from the equation.  The coefficient on Democracy in Equation 1 in
Table 2 is statistically significant and provides modest evidence that the variable plays a role in the
U.S. decision of whether to provide aid.  The evidence should be interpreted as modest for two
reasons.  First, at least some of the estimated effects of Democracy in Equation 1 appear to be
regional effects (as a comparison with Equation 2 in Table 2 shows), and our results do not indicate
whether those regional effects are driven by regional-level Democracy or by other factors.  Second,
the magnitude of the estimated effect is not particularly large.33
One additional point with respect to the Democracy variable is important to remember.  In our
estimated equations, we control for Small Donor Aid.  This means that the estimated effects of
Democracy are conditional on the extent to which the small donors respond to the Democracy
variable.  If the Small Donor Aid variables are dropped from Equations 1 and 2 in Table 2, the
34The coefficient on Democracy is .508 (t=3.09) in the re-estimated Equation 1 and .0404 (t=2.21)
in the re-estimated Equation 2.  The coefficients on the interaction terms for Democracy remain positive and
statistically insignificant, except for the marginally statistically significant coefficient (.369 with t=1.74) on
the interaction with Conservative Congress in Equation 1.
35As noted earlier, Goldstein and Moss (2003) examine the effects that U.S. regime changes have
on aid to Africa.  They construct dummy variables reflecting the party configuration of the presidency, the
Senate, and the House.  For example, RDD=1 if the president is a Republican while the Senate and House
are controlled by Democrats; RDD=0 otherwise.  Using the annual level or share of U.S. bilateral aid to
Africa from 1961 to 2000, they find that the party of the president does not explain aid allocation but that
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coefficient on Democracy is positive and statistically significant in both equations.34  Thus, the
coefficients on the Democracy variables reported in Table 2 should be interpreted as reflecting only
the component of recipient government quality that is not already captured by the econometric role
of Small Donor Aid.
Turning to the decision of what share of aid to provide to each country receiving aid, consider
Equation 3 in Table 2.  Again, liberal regimes in the U.S. appear to act more like small donors than
do conservative regimes, and the estimated effects of liberal-conservative shifts are substantial in
magnitude.  For example, under a liberal president and Congress (as during the late Carter era), the
estimated marginal effect of Small Donor Aid on U.S. Aid Share is .257, while under a conservative
president and Congress (as during the early Reagan era), the estimated marginal effect is less than
one tenth that size, at .023.  Furthermore, the role of the commercial proxies differs substantially
between liberal and conservative regimes, with the effect driven by Congress.  The estimated liberal-
regime marginal effect of U.S. Exports is .244, while the conservative-regime effect is larger, at .432.
The estimated liberal-regime marginal effect of U.S. Imports is -.140, while the conservative-regime
effect is larger (in absolute value), at -.251.  Overall, the results in Table 2 suggest that conservative
shifts tend to reduce the weight on development concerns and to increase the weight on commercial
concerns.35
the three-part party configuration variable does.  More than depending on which party is in power, aid to
Africa suffers when a president from one party faces a House and Senate controlled by the other party.  In
view of their results, we tested for similar phenomena with respect to our proxies for aid allocation criteria,
but we found no clear evidence of a systematic one-party versus divided-government effect.
We also investigated whether changes in the size of the aid budget might drive our results.  This is
potentially important because the size of the aid budget could, at least in principle, have an effect on aid
shares independently of whether liberal politicians differ from conservative politicians in terms of their aid
objectives.  To address this issue, we interacted the annual real US aid budget (aggregated over countries in
our data set) with Small Donor Aid, Exports, Imports, UN Voting, Democracy, GDP, and Population.  Our
main conclusions (the effects of liberal-conservative shifts) are robust to the inclusion of these seven
interaction terms.
36We also considered estimating the selection equation via conditional logit with country dummies.
This requires dropping countries with no variation (those that either always or never get U.S. aid), about half
our observations.  Consistent estimation is still theoretically possible but the procedure failed to converge.
37We gratefully acknowledge an anonymous referee for suggesting the comparison.
38A Heckman selection model would yield a single equation indicating unconditional expected aid
allocations.  However, when the selection equation includes time-varying factors, the fixed effects estimator
is inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 801).  Therefore, we estimated a sample selection model with
region dummies.  Comparing this to a conditional allocation equation with region dummies, we find similar
coefficient estimates and levels of statistical significance.  Nonetheless, we can reject the hypothesis of
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To investigate whether differences between the selection and allocation equations simply reflect
the use of region dummies in the former and country dummies in the latter, we re-estimated the
allocation equation with regional dummies.36  In contrast to the selection equation, regional dummies
are significant in the allocation equation.  In addition, previous differences between the selection and
allocation equations persist except for UN Voting in Table 1.  Now positive and significant in both
equations, this suggests that countries which persistently support the U.S. in the UN also have better
access to U.S. aid and, conditional on access, get a greater share.  Thus, this comparison supports
using separate selection and allocation equations and identifies an important link between UN Voting
and aid flows.37  In view of the fact that the expected aid allocation depends on both the selection
equation and the allocation equation, the allocation equations must be interpreted as conditional on
the selection of countries receiving positive amounts of aid.38
independent selection and allocation equations (p=.032).  Thus, we continue to interpret our reported
allocation equations as conditional on receiving aid but note that the sample selection bias introduced by an
unconditional interpretation is likely to be small.
39Boschini and Olofsgård (2001) examine the drop in aggregate aid from major donors that occurred
during the 1990s, and conclude that it occurred largely because of the end of the Cold War.
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Does the End of the Cold War Drive the Results?
For interpreting the results in Tables 1 and 2, an important historical consideration is the end of
the Cold War.  From the 1980s to the 1990s, the nature of foreign aid changed dramatically, with a
declining concern for fighting communism and a growing concern for transition economies.39  Tables
3 and 4 explore whether changes accompanying the end of the Cold War drive the results presented
in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 3 presents three specifications that are the same as those in Table 1, but are estimated with
data from 1960-1989.  The results are generally consistent with our major conclusions–namely, those
with respect to Small Donor Aid, U.S. Exports, and U.S. Imports–from the whole sample.  There is,
however, a difference worth noting with respect to Equation 2 (the probit specification with regional
dummies):  dropping the post-Cold War years from the data set causes the coefficient on UN Voting
to fall in magnitude and fail to reach statistical significance.  Thus, with respect to the full-sample
finding that strategic concerns matter through more than just regional effects, the level of confidence
does depend on the end of the Cold War.  Also note that with the Cold War years dropped from the
data set, the U.S. Exports variable in Equation 3 is significant at the 10% level, but is significant at
the 5% level for the full sample.  In sum, while including the post-Cold War years strengthens some
results, it does not drive the main results.
Table 4 presents results parallel to those in Table 2.  Again, excluding the post-Cold War years
40Although neither of the coefficients on the liberal-conservative interaction variables for Small
Donor Aid is individually statistically significant in Equation 1, the coefficients remain large in magnitude
and jointly significant at better than the 1% level (p=.005).  The levels of joint significance are much higher
in Equations 2 and 3.
41In a final set of robustness tests, we re-estimated our allocation equations using three methods of
dynamic panel estimation.  These tests are particularly useful for determining the degree to which our
conclusions are sensitive to our assumptions with respect to the speed at which U.S. aid policy responds to
liberal-conservative shifts in the U.S. government.  First, we added a lagged dependent variable to the third
equation from each of Tables 1-4; Appendix D presents the results for the equations including political
interactions.  The most notable changes are that (i) the statistically significant coefficient on UN Voting *
Cons Pres in Equation 3 of Table 2 becomes statistically insignificant in Equation 1 of Appendix D and (ii)
the statistically significant coefficient on Democracy * Cons Cong in Equation 3 of Table 4 becomes
statistically insignificant in Equation 2 of Appendix D.  Overall, the results support the main conclusions of
the paper.  Second, in addition to including fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable, we allowed an
AR1 process; again, the results supported our paper’s main conclusions.  The most notable change is that the
dynamic specifications with AR1 residuals have statistically significant positive coefficients on U.S. Exports
* Cons Pres.  Two other coefficients (UN Voting * Cons Pres in Equation 3 of Table 2; Democracy * Cons
Cong in Equation 3 of Table 4) remain positive but become statistically insignificant.  Third, we used the
Arellano and Bond (1991) method and, once again, found evidence supportive of the paper’s conclusions
and not greatly different from the results reported in Tables 1-4.  In sum, although our results are (of course)
not completely independent of our assumptions with respect to speed of adjustment and lag structure, our
paper’s main conclusions are robust to substantial changes in the econometric treatment of dynamic changes
in aid policy.  All results mentioned here are available upon request.
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yields results that are generally consistent with those for the full sample.  It is worth noting, however,
that the level of statistical significance does fall for some variables.  This is an unsurprising effect
of reducing the sample size (especially because estimating the effects of liberal-conservative shifts
depends on having sufficient variation over time, and Table 4 drops eight of thirty-eight years).40
Overall, the similarity of the coefficients between Tables 2 and 4 shows that the coefficients of
interest in Table 2 are not merely artifacts of the transition from the Cold War era to the post-Cold
War era.41
4.  Conclusion
This paper examines the determinants of U.S. bilateral aid allocations.  Our analysis of panel data
42See, for example, the highly influential 1998 World Bank publication Assessing Aid.
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from 1960 to 1997 indicates that several aid allocation criteria–development concerns, commercial
importance, strategic importance, and the level of autocracy or democracy–play a role.  Our analysis
also indicates that aid allocation criteria differ systematically and substantially between liberal and
conservative regimes.  Under liberal regimes, the distribution of U.S. bilateral aid more closely
mirrors that of small donors known for their development-oriented and humanitarian approach to
aid.  Commercial concerns have greater weight under conservative regimes than under liberal
regimes.  Specifically, under conservative Congresses (relative to liberal Congresses), the U.S.
allocates aid in a manner that appears more mercantilist-oriented.  That is, when conservatives
allocate aid, they appear to place greater weight on whether the U.S. exports much to, and does not
import much from, aid-receiving countries.
These findings contribute directly to the understanding of the domestic politics of U.S. aid and,
by doing so, provide new insight into the prospects for reforming aid policy.  Over the last decade,
a vigorous debate over how to improve aid effectiveness has led to calls by aid agencies and scholars
for a policy of ex post selectivity–less funding for traditional projects and structural adjustment
programs, more general budgetary support for developing country governments that have already
demonstrated improved governance.42  Proponents of this position attribute the failure of traditional
aid programs at least in part to lax donor enforcement:  even when recipients flout aid conditions,
donors often continue making disbursements and even new commitments (Mosley et al., 1995;
Svensson,  2000, 2003; Villanger, 2004).  Ex post selectivity may be able to solve this enforcement
problem (because aid flows will not occur until after reform takes place), but only if donors
consistently reward desired changes in developing countries.  In other words, selectivity can work
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only if donors can credibly commit to the policy.  Yet if donor policy changes with the political
cycle–and in the case of the U.S. it apparently does–the ability for the donor to make a credible
commitment is questionable.
Furthermore, understanding the aid allocation process is central to the debate over the effect of
aid on growth.  The fact that development aid is targeted toward countries with poor records of
growth has long clouded the link between aid and growth.  Recent attempts to solve this potential
endogeneity problem make use of factors that influence aid allocations yet do not depend on
recipient need; the most notable of these factors stem from the political motive for aid (Boone, 1996;
Burnside and Dollar, 2000).  This debate remains contentious (Beynon, 2002; Easterly, Levine, and
Roodman, 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Roodman, 2004), and a more fully developed model of the
political economy of aid allocation would allow more precise estimation of the effects of aid.  Our
findings are a step toward a more fully developed model.  Furthermore, our results point to an
important caveat for those attempting to instrument for aid with political variables:  the political
circumstances in donor countries are likely to affect not only the amounts of aid to developing
countries, but the motivation for providing that aid–including the extent to which aid is focused on
reaching development objectives.  Thus, political variables may instrument, in part, for the purpose
of aid.  And the purpose of aid will likely influence the effects of aid on development.
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Appendix A:  Variables
Receives U.S. Aid:  Takes a value of one for year t and country i if U.S. bilateral aid to country i is
positive in year t.  Aid measured as “Total Official Gross.”  Aid data from OECD DAC database
(OECD Development Assistance Committee 2004).
U.S. Aid Share:  For year t and country i, U.S. bilateral aid to country i, divided by total U.S.
bilateral aid in year t.  The measure of total U.S. bilateral aid for year t is based on aid to countries
in our data set, and, for a country to be included in that total, it must have data available to calculate
all of our share variables (U.S. Aid; Small Donor Aid; U.S. Exports; U.S. Imports; Population) for
that year.  Aid measured as “Total Official Gross.”  Aid data from OECD DAC database (OECD
Development Assistance Committee 2004).
Small Donor Aid:  For year t and country i, small donor bilateral aid to country i, divided by total
small donor bilateral aid in year t.  The measure of total small donor aid for year t is based on aid to
countries in our data set, and, for a country to be included in that total, it must have data available
to calculate all of our share variables (U.S. Aid; Small Donor Aid; U.S. Exports; U.S. Imports;
Population) for that year.  Aid measured as “Total Official Gross.”  Small donors are:  Canada,
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden.  Aid data from OECD DAC database (OECD
Development Assistance Committee 2004).
UN Voting:  Gartzke, Jo, and Tucker’s (1999) S measure of UN voting affinity between the U.S. and
country i in year t-1.
U.S. Exports:  Exports from the U.S. to country i in year t-1, divided by total exports from the U.S.
to aid-receiving countries in our data set in year t-1.  For a country to be included in that total, it must
have data available to calculate all of our share variables (U.S. Aid; Small Donor Aid; U.S. Exports;
U.S. Imports; Population) for that year.  Export data from International Monetary Fund (1999).
U.S. Imports:  Imports into the U.S. from country i in year t-1, divided by total imports into the U.S.
from aid-receiving countries in our data set in year t-1.  For a country to be included in that total, it
must have data available to calculate all of our share variables (U.S. Aid; Small Donor Aid; U.S.
Exports; U.S. Imports; Population) for that year.  Import data from International Monetary Fund
(1999).
Democracy:  Country i’s Polity rating in year t-1.  The Polity rating ranges from -10 (extreme
autocracy) to 10 (extreme democracy).  For details, see Marshall and Jaggers (2000).  Data available
from:  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm (Polity IV Project, 2000).
Population:  Population of country i in year t-1, divided by total population of aid-receiving countries
in our data set in year t-1.  For a country to be included in that total, it must have data available to
calculate all of our share variables (U.S. Aid; Small Donor Aid; U.S. Exports; U.S. Imports;
Population) for that year.  Population data from Penn World Table (Heston and Summers 2002),
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supplemented with population data from World Bank (2004) for observations with missing data in
Penn World Table.
GDP:  Real per capita GDP (chain index) in country i in year t-1, in thousands of 1996 dollars.  From
Penn World Table (Heston and Summers 2002).
Cons Pres and Cons Cong:  Liberal-Conservative locations of the president and Congress based on
Poole’s (1998) common space NOMINATE locations for the president, the House, and the Senate.
See, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for a discussion of the NOMINATE algorithm.  Higher scores
on the dimension reflect more conservative positions.  Poole (1998) calculated the House and Senate
scores by averaging individual members’ scores.  Our congressional measure is the average of
Poole’s House and Senate scores.  Because government spending policies in any given year are
influenced largely by budget decisions in the previous year, in our empirical analysis we lag the
liberal-conservative scores by one year.  To address the issue of incomplete presidential terms, we
treat Kennedy as if he served a full term and Nixon as if he served half of his second term.  Appendix
C presents the actual data.  (We obtained the common space data from Keith Poole.)
Regional Dummies:  We define our regional dummies using the World Bank’s categorization of
countries into six regions:  East Asia and Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North
Africa; Latin America and Carribean; South Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa.  The East Asia and Pacific
region is omitted from our estimated equations in order to allow the estimation of a constant term.
As explained in Section II, we cannot include a South Asia dummy because the estimated probits
would predict perfectly for that region.
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Appendix B:  Descriptive Statistics and Sample Coverage
Number of Observations:  2907
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Receives Aid 0.88235 0.32224 0 1
U.S. Aid Share 0.01177 0.02651 0 0.41916
Small Donor Aid 0.01222 0.03355 0 0.62732
U.S. Exports 0.01139 0.02866 0 0.34091
U.S. Imports 0.01302 0.03170 0 0.35618
UN Voting -0.08664 0.31616 -0.657 0.894
Democracy -1.47437 6.87932 -10 10
GDP 3.17538 2.72415 0.30981 24.93885
Population 0.01173 0.03732 0.00009 0.51213
Sample Coverage:  The complete data set is an unbalanced annual, country-level panel of 119
countries over 38 years (1960-1997), with 2907 observations.  The panel is unbalanced, most notably
because some countries came into existence, while others disappeared, during the time period
covered in our data set.  We have excluded observations from our data set if they have a missing
variable.  In addition, we have excluded three pairs of countries entirely:  China and Taiwan because
they lack complete UN voting (and other) data, North Korea and South Korea because they also lack
complete UN voting (and other) data, and Israel and Egypt because they receive such large shares
of U.S. aid for reasons that differ from the focus of this paper.  The years of our sample are
determined by the availability of data:  The aid data necessary to construct our aid variables are
available beginning with 1960, and the UN Voting variable (which we lag one year) is available only
through 1996.
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Appendix C:  Liberal-Conservative Shifts
Year
Elected
             Executive House Senate  




1956 Eisenhower 0.267 R
1958 -0.028 D -0.042 D
1960 Kennedy -0.524 D -0.014 D -0.026 D
1962 -0.017 D -0.076 D
1964 Johnson -0.412 D -0.062 D -0.084 D
1966 -0.025 D -0.080 D
1968 Nixon 0.280 R -0.027 D -0.059 D
1970 -0.035 D -0.053 D
1972 -0.031 D -0.074 D
1974 Ford 0.251 R -0.074 D -0.093 D
1976 Carter -0.470 D -0.064 D -0.090 D
1978 -0.044 D -0.071 D
1980 Reagan 0.479 R -0.009 D 0.010 R
1982 -0.029 D 0.010 R
1984 -0.014 D 0.007 R
1986 -0.016 D -0.027 D
1988 Bush 0.456 R -0.019 D -0.027 D
1990 -0.026 D -0.039 D
1992 Clinton -0.363 D -0.018 D -0.034 D
1994 0.034 R 0.013 R
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Dependent Variable U.S. Aid Share U.S. Aid Share
Small Donor Aidi,t 0.0162 -0.0555
(0.51) (2.03)*
Small Donor Aidi,t*Cons Prest!1 -0.1503 -0.0888
(5.30)** (3.43)**
Small Donor Aidi,t*Cons Congt!1 -1.267 -1.720
(3.25)** (5.12)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1 0.2927 0.5619
(3.70)** (7.28)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 0.0346 -0.0026
(0.59) (0.47)
U.S. Exportsi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 2.533 3.880
(2.92)** (4.92)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1 -0.1950 -0.2494
(2.88)** (3.99)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 0.0063 -0.0025
(0.12) (0.06)
U.S. Importsi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 -1.9444 -2.571
(2.62)** (3.86)**
UN Votingi,t!1 -0.0013 0.0048
(0.24) (0.95)
UN Votingi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 0.0069 0.0046
(1.38) (0.95)




Democracyi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 -.00006 -0.0002
(0.55) (1.26)







U.S. Aid Sharei,t!1 0.2909 0.3434
(14.74)** (15.35)**
Year Dummies included included
Observations 2502 1834
Number of Countries 111 77
R-squared (within) .3310 .4759




t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Appendix D Continued
Table 1:  Selection and Allocation Equations, 1960-1997
(1) (2) (3)




Dependent Variable Receives U.S. Aid Receives U.S. Aid U.S Aid Share
Small Donor Aidi,t 72.419 66.049 0.234
(3.11)** (3.09)** (12.70)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1 7.864 4.824 0.256
(1.09) (0.80) (6.00)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1 -1.182 -2.713 -0.074
(0.35) (0.93) (2.50)*
UN Votingi,t!1 1.361 1.209 -0.001
(2.45)* (2.00)* (0.31)
Democracyi,t!1 0.020 0.013 0.00002
(1.73) (0.89) (0.19)
GDPi,t!1 -0.13883 -0.12658 -0.00125
(4.55)** (3.82)** (2.89)**
Populationi,t!1 -8.91606 -4.44211 1.28353
(1.17) (0.44) (13.57)**
Year Dummies included included included
Observations 2907 2907 2565
Number of Countries 119 119 111
Pseudo R-squared 0.204 0.227
R-squared (within) 0.301











t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2:  Selection and Allocation Equations with Political Interactions, 1960-1997
(1) (2) (3)




Dependent Variable Receives U.S. Aid Receives U.S. Aid U.S. Aid Share
Small Donor Aidi,t 31.744 27.839 0.088
(1.46) (1.56) (2.92)**
Small Donor Aidi,t*Cons Prest!1 -62.422 -59.339 -0.134
(2.05)* (1.92) (4.60)**
Small Donor Aidi,t*Cons Congt!1 -1,190.471 -1,115.153 -1.843
(2.87)** (3.13)** (4.65)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1 11.934 12.720 0.425
(1.02) (1.14) (5.28)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 1.659 0.329 0.012
(0.23) (0.05) (0.20)
U.S. Exportsi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 69.213 97.510 3.057
(0.66) (0.98) (3.43)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1 -8.524 -11.842 -0.271
(0.99) (1.42) (3.92)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 3.291 3.714 0.043
(0.79) (0.94) (0.76)
U.S. Importsi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 -109.023 -123.457 -2.617
(1.30) (1.53) (3.42)**
UN Votingi,t!1 0.605 0.751 -0.004
(1.17) (1.17) (0.82)
UN Votingi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 0.002 -0.264 0.012
(0.00) (0.56) (2.34)*
UN Votingi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 -14.838 -8.461 -0.076
(1.63) (1.04) (1.04)
Democracyi,t!1 0.038 0.028 0.00012
(2.36)* (1.62) (0.80)
Democracyi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 0.010 0.007 -0.00006
(0.89) (0.57) (0.46)
Democracyi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 0.279 0.241 0.00191
(1.18) (1.02) (1.08)
GDPi,t!1 -0.139 -0.129 -0.00114
(4.60)** (3.93)** (2.66)**
Populationi,t!1 -8.385 -5.548 1.49698
(1.38) (0.88) (15.19)**
Year Dummies included included included
Observations 2907 2907 2565
Number of Countries 119 119 111
Pseudo R-squared 0.224 0.244
R-squared (within) 0.325











t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2 Continued
Table 3:  Selection and Allocation Equations, 1960-1989
(1) (2) (3)




Dependent Variable Receives U.S. Aid Receives U.S. Aid U.S. Aid Share
Small Donor Aidi,t 76.500 62.697 0.186
(2.52)* (2.37)* (11.13)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1 6.398 2.443 0.604
(0.75) (0.36) (13.24)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1 3.010 -0.153 -0.048
(0.65) (0.04) (1.79)
UN Votingi,t!1 1.490 0.842 -0.00040
(2.43)* (1.44) (0.14)
Democracyi,t!1 0.015 0.012 -0.00004
(1.18) (0.70) (0.34)
GDPi,t!1 -0.157 -0.146 -0.00233
(3.66)** (3.02)** (4.22)**
Populationi,t!1 -12.403 -0.935 1.35281
(1.04) (0.07) (15.09)**
Year Dummies included included included
Observations 2144 2144 1886
Number of Countries 82 82 77
Pseudo R-squared 0.204 0.259
R-squared (within) 0.411








t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4:  Selection and Allocation Equations with Political Interactions, 1960-1989
(1) (2) (3)




Dependent Variable Receives U.S. Aid Receives U.S. Aid U.S. Aid Share
Small Donor Aidi,t 103.955 80.163 0.033
(1.49) (1.49) (1.24)
Small Donor Aidi,t*Cons Prest!1 -173.599 -149.818 -0.073
(1.72) (1.69) (2.65)**
Small Donor Aidi,t*Cons Congt!1 -935.532 -916.018 -2.104
(1.55) (1.99)* (5.79)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1 0.526 1.928 0.879
(0.03) (0.11) (11.19)**
U.S. Exportsi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 4.800 3.518 -0.068
(0.40) (0.30) (1.13)
U.S. Exportsi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 -26.901 6.829 4.726
(0.15) (0.04) (5.60)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1 1.226 -3.946 -0.347
(0.10) (0.33) (5.20)**
U.S. Importsi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 3.958 3.106 0.021
(0.71) (0.58) (0.42)
U.S. Importsi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 -46.771 -61.490 -3.594
(0.42) (0.56) (5.01)**
UN Votingi,t!1 0.829 0.447 0.00006
(1.24) (0.63) (0.01)
UN Votingi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 0.045 -0.001 0.00710
(0.10) (0.00) (1.36)
UN Votingi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 -14.136 -8.518 0.02949
(1.14) (0.71) (0.39)
Democracyi,t!1 0.027 0.027 0.00021
(1.23) (1.14) (1.29)
Democracyi,t!1*Cons Prest!1 0.020 0.007 -0.00018
(1.22) (0.43) (1.32)
Democracyi,t!1*Cons Congt!1 0.209 0.239 0.00397
(0.69) (0.86) (2.18)*
GDPi,t!1 -0.155 -0.146 -0.00162
(3.74)** (3.07)** (2.94)**
Populationi,t!1 -10.474 -4.720 1.58047
(1.37) (0.61) (16.72)**
Year Dummies included included included
Observations 2144 2144 1886
Number of Countries 82 82 77
Pseudo R-squared 0.237 0.285
R-squared (within) 0.441











t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 4 Continued
